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This paper studies the barter industry developed in North America during the
1950s, pointing out some of its main characteristics. Thus, it examines its two main
sectors: (i) Corporate Barter and (ii) Commercial Barter. Contrary to
expectations, the analysis of official data shows that this phenomenon is essentially
pro-cyclical for the Commercial Barter component. Moreover, commercial barter
activity turns out to be complementary to the cash economy. While the two sectors
display some differences in their pattern, they both help firms to increase their
profits.
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1- Introduction
At the beginning of the new millennium, instead of disappearing, barter is
gaining new ground in our modern economies. While it is estimated that in 1999
U.S. domestic barter volume has reached $11 billion, economic literature has
focused mainly on compensatory practices in international trade, and only
occasionally on barter among companies in industrialized countries.
The main aim of this paper is to understand some basic aspects of the role
of barter in industrialized economies as well as the main characteristics of the so-
called barter industry. Therefore, it presents an empirical analysis of the U.S. barter
industry, the first one to develop, with the purpose of determining the
macroeconomic variables influencing it.
After a brief description of the barter industry, the paper reviews the main
literature on barter, pointing out its salient contributions as well as its limits. In a
second part, the paper develops an empirical investigation to check the consistency
of some of the beliefs the present literature supports on barter. Therefore, we start
the analysis by confronting barter data with a plurality of macroeconomics series to
determine the variables which seem to best explain the U.S. barter. As both the
corporate barter time series and the retail barter one are trending consistently
upwards, confirming the importance of barter as a growing phenomenon, we check
for the presence of unit root nonstationarity in data in order to avoid spurious
regression problems. Therefore, we undertake DF and ADF unit root tests to test
the null hypothesis of nonstationarity and determine the order of integration of the
different time series previously selected. Finally, we attempt to estimate an error-
correction model (ECM) for each of the significant explanatory variable previously
selected to integrate the dynamics of short-run (changes) with long-run (levels)
adjustment processes. Given the limited sample at hand, we have chosen to resort
to the one step method indicated by Banerjee et al. (1986).
2 - Barter at stake
Originated in the 1950s in the United States, organized barter among
companies has recorded a dramatic growth in few decades, giving rise to a
completely new and still growing industry. At present, the barter industry is
spreading in almost all industrialized countries, attracting an increasing number of
businesses. According to the International Reciprocal Trade Association (IRTA),
the official spokesman of the industry, 65% of the "Fortune 500" engage in barter,
among which PepsiCo, Pizza Hut, IBM, Xerox, and Good Year. At present, it is
also estimated that in North America there are already approximately a quarter-
million firms bartering through specialized barter networks (IRTA 1999).
Basically, it is possible to distinguish two forms of barter, that is, corporate
and retail barter, which together constitute the two sectors of the industry. The
corporate barter sector is made up of corporate barter companies, which are a sort
of brokerage houses, helping large companies to exchange their products for other
desired services or goods. However, transactions are not settled on a pure barter
basis, but usually require part of the payment in cash.
Retail barter or commercial trade exchange on the other hand deals with
small and medium businesses. This sector is made up of barter networks, known as2
trade exchanges, or barter clubs, coordinating barter trade among their members.
The technology advances in computer science gave the possibility to trade
exchanges to organize barter on a multilateral basis since the end of the 1970s,
giving thus birth to what nowadays is known as electronic barter or E-barter. These
multilateral barter networks work via a system of mutual credit. Thanks to the use
of a unit of account called trade credit to record the value of transactions, barter
does not need to be a direct synchronous bilateral transaction. Thanks to trade
credits, trade exchanges' members swap goods and services without using cash.
Indeed, within trade exchanges, the double coincidence of wants is no more a
prerequisite for barter to occur, and sales and purchases can be asynchronous.
Trade exchanges act as neutral third record keepers and charge a membership fee
and a transaction fee in cash for their services. Usually, a trade credit is equivalent
to a unit of the official currency of the country where the network is located. In the
barter market, prices are the same as in the cash one: sales are officially made at
full retail selling price.
Even if many industrialized countries have developed their own barter
industry, such a phenomenon has not attracted the interests of the economic
literature yet. The few existing studies essentially focus on marketing and
management aspects, and are based on questionnaire surveys of large companies
involved in at least a barter deal either domestic or international, or on direct
interviews with representatives of the industry (Neale et al. 1992; Healey 1996).
Besides relying only on the managers’ perceptions and estimates of the barter
phenomenon, these studies do not take into account retail barter. Indeed, they rather
contemplate either bilateral intra-national barter agreements or corporate barter,
which, like barter in international trade, are considered a second best solution with
respect to cash trade. In general, it is estimated that the explanations usually
adopted for compensatory practices in international trade may apply also to
corporate barter. While considered as inefficient, cumbersome and trade restrictive
practices (Kostecki 1987; Hammond 1990; Verzariu 2000), both countertrade and
offsets -the main forms of compensatory trade- are recognized to allow trade under
adverse conditions. Besides being supposed to represent an effective way to
overcome almost all financial difficulties and liquidity problems (Hammond 1990;
Verzariu 2000), countertrade has been adopted to obtain marketing advantages
when export market networks are inadequate or simply lacking (Verzariu 2000).
Moreover, in some cases, countertrade has been used as a cost reducing technique
(Vogt 1985; Verzariu 2000), or simply to maximize long term profits (Verzariu
2000), enter new markets and gain a competitive edge (Hammond 1990; Weigand
1979; Slee 1996; Verzariu 2000). Like countertrade, offsets happen to be used as a
marketing tool (Welt and Wilson 1998; Verzariu 2000), but they are also adopted
to promote economic development (Gao 1996), or to develop defense and high-
technologies industries (Gao 1996; U.S. Department of commerce 1999, Verzariu
2000).
On the other hand, theoretical studies have shown that international
bilateral barter deals can represent a second best solution in a context of market
incompleteness, imperfect contract enforcement conditions, and incomplete
information. Thus, countertrade contracts can help overcome moral hazard as well
as incentive problems arising in trade between countries with dissimilar economies.
By linking the import to the export, specific compensatory arrangements can help
to efficiently handle the risk that information on the quality of the traded
commodities could be hidden (Amman and Marin 1989), or can contribute to
reduce the incentives for cheating when the difficulties in monitoring agents are
increased by the international nature of the transaction (Choi and Maldoom 1992).3
Moreover, risk adverse countries facing a tight foreign-exchange constraint can
resort to countertrade to overcome the lack of perfect risk and insurance markets
(Amman and Marin 1994), or, in the specific case of technology trade, to solve
contractual problems in presence of asymmetric information and in the meantime
restore their creditworthiness (Marin and Schnitzer 1995). Indeed, this latter
advantage of barter is considered sufficient to explain its persistent success in
international trade. Moreover, by facilitating the enforcement of the contract, the
payment in kind is preferable to monetary payments when the importer is a highly
indebted country facing import-financing constraints due to sovereign-debt
problem. Indeed, by ranking the goods used as payment according with the level of
uncertainty about their quality and of the easiness with which property rights can
be defined, it seems even possible to predict the pattern of specialization in barter
trade (Marin and Schnitzer 2002a).
However, it is evident that most of these explanations cannot be used to
justify the development of a barter industry in industrialized countries for domestic
trade. Nevertheless, the idea that corporate companies resort to corporate barter to
overcome liquidity constraints, enter new markets, and gain both marketing and
competitive advantages is also supported by specialized publications like
BarterNews, promotional materials by corporate barter companies, and official
documents by both IRTA and the Corporate Barter Council (CBC).
However, even if it is recognized that under specific unfavorable
circumstances barter may bring some advantages, it is unanimously considered an
inefficient form of exchange per se. Indeed, it is common opinion that, even if
barter may result in being profitable, it should be avoided and even banned. This
because, although it may represent an effective means to deal with economic
imperfection, it is thought not to correct and solve such imperfection. If its
appearance during economic slowdown does not surprise, barter, in any of its
multiple forms, is not considered a solution to downturns, as it is not expected to
bring the economy out of the crisis, for which only drastic political and monetary
measures are advocated. Indeed, the resurgence of barter during crisis times
contributes to reinforce the inefficiency belief as well as the idea that traders
wouldn't yield to barter if it was not for the crisis. Actually, it is just sufficient to
look at the Russian economy to find proof of the inefficiency of barter, if any was
necessary. Even if it is recognized that Russian firms affected by a severe lack of
liquidity and confronted with an imperfect capital market environment may find in
barter a way to restore their creditworthiness as indebted countries do, the practice
is not expected to help the recovery of the Russian economy (Marin and Schnitzer
1999, and 2002b). Indeed, the International Monetary Found (IMF) does not
hesitate to clearly denounce the negative impact of barter on the Russian economy
(IMF 2000). However, the American Countertrade Association (ACA) has a
different opinion on the effect of barter in Russia. Indeed, ACA recognizes barter
to have a counter-cyclical effect on the Russian crisis. Indeed, it believes barter to
play a major role in avoiding total collapse (ACA 1999). From the reading of the
ACA report, it comes out that the negative effects of barter cannot be ascribed to
the presumed intrinsic inefficiency of barter as a form of exchange, but rather to the
catastrophic political and institutional situation afflicting the country. In other
words, the ACA report indicates the lack of political and institutional order as the
main cause making barter inefficient. Indeed, the existence of a well-developed
domestic barter industry in the United States reinforces the suspicion that the
economic environment influences the role of barter and the way barter may respond
to economic changes. Indeed, the U.S. barter industry questions the belief that
barter is intrinsically inefficient. Technology advances have made barter4
transactions simpler, faster and friendlier than ever so that now, for the first time in
history, barter can be preferred to cash transactions even when the latter are
affordable. In fact, some U.S. barter networks provide members with a dual credit
card, which gives users the possibility to decide if settling payment in kind or in
cash. In fact, the card can automatically distinguish between barter and cash
transactions, and so correctly note and process them (BarterNews 1999).
Moreover, the history of the U.S. barter industry shows how political stability
together with an effective and efficient legal system may facilitate the spreading of
barter. So, for example, by imposing tax payment on barter transactions, the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act promulgated by the U.S. Congress in 1982
can be considered as the deciding factor for the development of the barter industry.
By clearly regulating on the matter and deciding to treat barter income as
equivalent to cash income, the U.S. Congress gave to the barter industry a measure
of legitimacy. Moreover, by classifying trade exchanges as third-party record-
keepers with the same fiduciary obligations as banks, the 1982 Act legalized the
barter industry, allowing it to pursue its growth. Furthermore, as since 1982, barter
activity didn't disappear, the promulgation of the Fiscal and Responsibility Act
implicitly proved that firms do not engage in barter for tax evasion purposes.
Indeed, to avoid the suspicion of barter to be a tax evasion tool, Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia have followed the example of the United States, by formally
establishing as well that barter transactions are assessable and deductible to the
same extent as similar cash transactions. In this way, these countries have allowed
the birth of a domestic barter industry and facilitated its rapid development.
According to the specialized press, the IRTA and CBC official documents,
barter is a marketing and financial tool that corporations and businesses adopt to
move excess inventories, and exploit under-utilized plant capacity in order to
finance the cost of production. However, these explanations do not help understand
the role of barter in the U.S. economy and assess the kind of impact it exerts on it.
To be precise, it does not help understanding if barter plays a counter-cyclical role,
or if it is essentially a pro-cyclical phenomenon. Actually, the presence of a barter
industry in the United States, whose economy has continued to grow up until the
end of the ‘90s, seems a contradiction in itself if we consider barter to be a
symptom of economic crisis. Indeed, it is clear that we cannot explain the U.S.
domestic barter as we do for Russia.
Moreover, if we consider that the barter industry has developed two
different sectors, it seems reasonable to wonder if it is correct to assimilate all
modern barter practices, from countertrade to offsets, corporate barter, and
commercial E-barter, all together as barter as the literature above mentioned does.
In other words, we wonder if corporate and commercial barter play the same role,
or respond to different economic needs, thus requiring to be analyzed separately.
With the analysis of data for the U.S. barter industry, we aim to elucidate
some of the controversial points mentioned above. To sum up, we intend to check
if corporate barter and commercial barter have the same pattern, which would
allow us to consider them as a unique phenomenon, and if domestic barter presents
counter-cyclical feature. Moreover, we aim to check if firms resort to barter to get
rid of excess inventories and/or exploit under-utilized plant capacity as the
specialized press claims. This leads us to first consider how barter series behave
when confronted with macroeconomic series like GDP and its other components,
with series regarding domestic business, or with those concerning the
manufacturing industry. Indeed, through a first screening, we select for each group
of time series the variables that seem to be more correlated to barter. In a second5
step, we try to estimate different error correction models capturing some basic
features of barter dynamics to finally shed some light on barter.
3 - What data reveal
The data we used are those released by IRTA on barter volume in North
America between 1974-1999. As values for 1975 are missing (see Annex I, Tab.
A), we took the 1974 ones as a proxy for 1975. Unfortunately, data are not
comprehensive of total barter occurring in the United States, as they concern only
the activity of barter organizations affiliated to IRTA. Therefore, for example, they
do not include the activity of Atwood Richards
1, one of the oldest barter
organizations in the United States and one of the largest barter corporations in
terms of annual transactions.
Unfortunately, at present these are the only available data for the American
barter industry. Even if since 1982 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
introduced a special entry to invoice barter income in its forms for tax payment, it
does not release information on the barter activity declared by businesses. Clearly,
the lack of more detailed and disaggregated data strongly limits the type of analysis
that is possible to conduct. However, we believe that these data are sufficient to
disclose most of the basic features of barter we are interested in.
Macroeconomic time series for the U.S. economy were taken from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) tables. All series were transformed in real
terms using a 1996-chained deflator, as given by BEA.
When considered in level, both corporate and retail barter present a similar
pattern, characterized by a strong upward trend component (Annex II, Fig. 1).
However, the graph of the growth rate of both series  shows  a quite different
behaviour of the two forms of barter over time (Annex II, Fig. 2), suggesting the
necessity of a differentiated analysis. Indeed, regressions on commercial barter and
corporate barter confirmed the different pattern of the two realities.
Therefore, we decided to start the analysis with the commercial barter
sector. Indeed, barter through trade exchanges seems to us more interesting as it
can be considered more "barter" than the one performed through corporate barter
companies. In fact, commercial barter consists of true moneyless exchanges, while
corporate barter transactions involve also a consistent share of cash.
a) Commercial barter
Graphic analysis indicates commercial barter to be slightly correlated with GDP
(Annex II, Fig. 3) as well as with capacity utilization of the manufacturing sector
for durable goods (Annex II, Fig. 6). On the other hand, a stronger correlation is
found with both private wholesale trade and retail trade inventories (Annex II, Fig.
4 and 5 respectively).
By comparing commercial barter growth with that of GDP, we can easily
see that the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act had no effect on trade
                                                
1 Atwood Richard has been acquired by the international barter company Argent Trading LLC in 2000.6
exchange activity, confirming that the success of present barter does not rely on tax
evasion.
As we intended to identify the variables that may influence commercial
barter, we decided to confront barter data with other more specific macroeconomic
series, thus taking also into account single components of GDP, in particular the
GNP by the service sector. Moreover, we confront barter data also with time series
accounting private inventories and final sales of the U.S. domestic business, and
time series relative to the capacity utilization rates of the U.S. manufacturing
industry. In Annex I-Box 1, we define the variables we selected to study the
commercial barter sector.
Tab. 1 - ADF unit root tests for stationarity
Variables Levels † First Differences with










† The critical value calculated from McKinnon tables for levels with constant and trend at
10% significance is -3.2677, at 5% is -3.6591, and at 1% significance is -4.5000.
†† The critical value calculated from McKinnon tables for levels with constant, but
without trend at 10% significance is -2.6502, at 5% is -3.0199, and at 1% significance is -
3.8067.
*Indicates rejection of null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 5% level and ** for
rejection at 1% level.
Graphic analysis leads to suspect that some or all of the variables are
nonstationary. Therefore, we performed the unit root tests for stationarity on both
levels and first differences of all the selected variables. Table 1 presents the results
of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests and the corresponding
McKinnon critical values. The ADF tests were run using a constant and a trend,
while the lag length was determined in a general-to-specific modeling strategy.
Given the annual nature of the data, lag length was initially set at 4. For the results
in the table it is clear that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all time series
in level form at the 5 percent level, yet it is rejected for all series in growth form.
However, for both time series of wholesale and retail trade inventories, the ADF
test for the growth form was run without including the trend component. Indeed,
also GDP series become stationary when the trend is excluded. This result is7
supported also by the graph analysis of the growth rate of the series, which does
not exhibit any trend tendency. Moreover, the correlogram indicates that the GDP
growth series follows an AR(1) process. Therefore, in the light of these elements,
we decided for the GDP series to accept the result of the ADF test including the
constant but not the trend. Thus, we conclude that all the variables are integrated of
order one, or I(1), as they are stationary in first difference.
Given the small sample available on barter data, we have opted for the
Banerjee et al. (1986) one step method to determine the long-run relationship
between retail barter and the selected explanatory variables. Once again, we
followed the general-to-specific modeling approach to identify the dynamic
regressions that better fit the data.
Even if, in graphics, all series exhibit a trend component, we decided to
focus the analysis on the results obtained excluding a trend tendency, as regressions
including a trend displayed very unsatisfactory results. Indeed, all variables loose
in significance if compared with the same regressions without a trend. Moreover,
according to the level of significance at 5 percent, trend itself results to be not
significant.
For the same reasons, we decided not to put the series accounting for
inventories and that of capacity utilization rate for durable goods in the same
regression. When analyzed together with either GDP or GNP of the service sector
all variables loose in significance. Moreover, in these cases, according to the
residual based ADF-test for cointegration, residuals of the static regressions are not
stationary, indicating that the variables taken in group of four are not cointegrated.
The Johansen test confirmed the result of no cointegration. On the contrary, if we
restrict the analysis to groups of only three variables, the residual based ADF-test
for cointegration indicates that the variables of the groups including the GNP of the
service sector are cointegrated. However, as the graphic analysis of commercial
barter growth led to suspect, the variables turn out to be cointegrated starting from
the year 1978. Indeed, as the commercial barter series begins only in 1974, which
is taken as a proxy for the 1975, adjustments should be expected during the first
years. Results concerning both short and long-run dynamics are given in Table 2.
Actually, all dynamic regressions in table 2 are run on a restricted sample ranging
from 1978 to 1999. Being particularly interested in the long-run dynamics, the
implied long-run relationship from each of the estimated equation has been
reported also separately and presented in Table 3. Clearly, the choice of the group
of variables in the regressions displayed in table 3 has been determined by our
interest in assessing the influence of the economic cycle on barter. Therefore, the
regressions taking into account the GDP series have been included, even if the
variables do not result to be cointegrated. Besides comparative purposes, it seemed
appropriated to include the GDP series in the analysis also because commercial
barter and GDP on their own pass the cointegration test.
As table 3 shows, in the long-run, regressions on commercial barter do not
indicate any counter-cyclical trend. On the contrary, commercial barter seems to
follow the tendency of the economy and to be rather pro-cyclical. Given that the
variables analyzed in the dynamic regressions (2), (3) and (5) in table 2 proved to
be cointegrated, the coefficient of the error correction term of these regressions is
effectively statistically significant, suggesting the validity of the long-run
equilibrium relationship. Moreover, the coefficients of these error correction terms
are very close, as they vary between 0.28 to 0.34, indicating a low speed of
adjustment. Actually, it is worth noting that even the error correction term of the
dynamic regressions including the GDP series indicates a similar pattern. Indeed,
both error correction terms, which are still very close to those of the other8
regressions - 0.23 and 0.25-, indicate an even lower speed of adjustment. Indeed,
we believe that such a difference in the speed of adjustment has to be ascribed to
the fact that, besides the GNP of the service sector, the GDP variable also
incorporates all the other real components of the economy. The slightly higher
error correction terms associated with the GNP of the service sector corroborate
that retail barter is effectively particularly sensitive to such component of the GDP.
According to us, this result confirms that for small and medium businesses the
barter market is complementary to the cash one. Once a firm enrolls itself in a trade
exchange, it shows its intention to barter on a regular basis. The membership fee it
has to pay deters it from adopting "hit and run" behaviors. Thus, for a firm the
choice of bartering is a long-term decision, which takes time to revert once the
economic conditions change.
As table 3 puts in evidence, the estimated coefficients of the lagged
variables in the cointegrating vector present a positive sign with the exception of
wholesale inventories. However, it is difficult to assess the effective influence of
inventories on commercial barter in the long-run. Being both wholesale and retail
inventories not statistically significant (see Tab. 2), it is difficult to understand
which is the correct relation: the positive one by retail inventories or the negative
one by wholesales inventories. Therefore, given such indeterminacy, our results do
not allow us to conclude that firms resort to barter to move excess inventories as
the specialized press sustains. Anyway, the influence of inventories seems
irrelevant with respect to the overall results. On the other hand, our results confirm
the influence of the GNP by the service sector. Actually, we find this outcome
particularly interesting and relevant. While the service sector supplies non-storable
goods, the manufacturing one supplies goods for which storage is expensive. Now
barter seems to be especially suitable for the trade of goods that cannot be stored
for goods whose storage involve a positive cost, and the commercial barter industry
seems to offer an efficient solution to the needs of the two sectors. Actually,
commercial barter seems to arise from a sort of double coincidence of wants,
implicitly linking the service and the manufacturing sectors. Indeed, this is
precisely the impression one has from the specialized press according to which
most of the commercial barter consists of exchanges of services for goods. The
relative importance of both capacity utilization rate and inventories in explaining
commercial barter as attested by the relative high R
2 value seems to confirm the
hypothesis of such a form of double coincidence of wants.
Concerning the capacity utilization rate, the dynamic regressions indicate
unequivocally a positive relation with commercial barter both in the short and the
long-run. Clearly, such an outcome goes against the view supported by the
specialized press that barter is adopted to exploit under-utilized plant capacity. On
the contrary, the positive sign of the coefficients of the capacity utilization rate is
consistent with our belief that U.S. firms resort to barter to increase their profits
and not to overcome trade difficulties depending on some form of market
imperfection or incompleteness. Therefore, also this result supports the hypothesis
that barter activity has to be considered as complementary to the cash economy.
The diagnostic test statistics show no evidence of misspecification, no serial
correlation, and nor any problem of heteroskedasticity (see Tab.2). Moreover,
according to the Jarque-Bera statistic, disturbances result to be normally
distributed.9
Tab. 2 - Error Correction Model for Retail Barter
Estimate * Diagnostic tests **
(1) ∆LTRADEXt=      –       4.8    –    0.13 ∆LGDPt       +0.34 ∆LWHOLE_INVt   +
(–1.733013)      (–0.228559)   (1.035669)
                    – 0.25 LTRADEXt-1   +   0.74 LGDPt-1    –     0.21 LWHOLE_INVt-1
                        (–2.505991)                 (2.431312)                    (–0.749413)
R
2= 0.752642                            Akaike =-3.414939                    DW = 2.017679
Breusch-Godfrey (1 lag)                         χ² =0.76   [0.38]
 ARCH                                                      χ² =0.57    [0.44]
White                                                        χ² =17.40  [0.06]
Ramsey's RESET (1)                           F-stat= 1.90 [0.18]
Ramsey's RESET (2)                           F-stat= 2.37 [0.12]
(2) ∆LTRADEXt=         –    3.34      –     1.19 ∆LGNPSRVt      +    0.37 ∆LWHOLE_INVt   +
(–1.157079)    (–1.323466)                     (1.575045)
   –     0.29 LTRADEXt-1  +    0.54 LGNPSRVt-1    –     0.03 LWHOLE_INVt-1
          (–2.230851)  (2.453161)                     (–0.111520)
R
2= 0.801349    Akaike =-3.634226                  DW stat= 2.038695
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                                χ² = 0.40 [0.52]
ARCH                                                        χ² =  0.64 [0.48]
White                                                        χ² = 16.78 [0.07]
Ramsey's RESET (1)                           F-stat=1.17 [0.29]
Ramsey's RESET (2)                           F-stat=1.82 [0.19]
(3) ∆LTRADEXt=        –     4.18       –     1.06 ∆LGNPSRVt     +    0.29 ∆LRETAIL_INVt   +
(–2.725488)    (–1.257854)                         (1.046092)
  –     0.34 LTRADEXt-1  +     0.34 LGNPSRVt-1      + 0.38 LRETAIL_INVt-1
          (-4.056916)      (1.030767)                       (1.392523)
R
2= 0.795508    Akaike =-3.605246                  DW stat= 1.928989
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                                χ² = 0.13 [0.70]
ARCH                                                       χ² =   0.11 [0.73]
White                                                        χ² = 15.08 [0.12]
Ramsey's RESET (1)                           F-stat=0.48 [0.49]
Ramsey's RESET (2)                           F-stat=2.58 [0.11]
(4) ∆LTRADEXt =         –     3.81        –    1.21 ∆LGDPt      +    0.96 ∆LUTCAPDURt +
(–1.168066) (–1.250512) (2.23242)
   –   0.23 LTRADEXt-1  +    0.50 15LGDPt-1    +     0.45 LUTCAPDURt-1
           –2.215641)     (1.435170)                (1.646857)
R
2 = 0.792525          Akaike = -3.590761                DW stat = 1.989259
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                              χ² =   0.12 [0.72]
ARCH                                                       χ² = 0.10   [0.74]
White                                                        χ² = 11.94 [0.28]
Ramsey's RESET (1)                           F-stat= 4.04 [0.06]
Ramsey's RESET (2)                           F-stat= 2.35 [0.13]
(5) ∆LTRADEXt =      –      2.87         –      0.63 ∆LGNPSRVt       +    0.34 ∆LUTCAPDURt +
(–1.584930)           (–0.745046) (1.459018)
      –    0.28 LTRADEXt-1    +    0.47 LGNPSRVt-1     +    0.37 LUTCAPDURt-1
              (–2.919341)           (2.049843)              (1.658270)
R
2= 0.806410       Akaike = -3.660032                    DW stat = 2.032860
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                                 χ² = 0.31 [0.57]
ARCH                                                        χ² =  0.38 [0.53]
White                                                        χ² = 14.62 [0.14]
Ramsey's RESET (1)                           F-stat= 0.40 [0.53]
Ramsey's RESET (2)                           F-stat= 1.33 [0.29]
* Values in round brackets: T-statistic
** Value in squared brackets: p-value
(Further test details available upon request.)10
Tab. 3 – Long-run relationship for Retail Barter
(1) LTRADEX       =  – 19         +    2.95 LGDP            –    0.85 LWHOLE_INV
(2) LTRADEX       =  – 11.27     +    1.84 LGNPSRV    –    0.21 LWHOLE_INV
(3) LTRADEX       =  – 12.06     +    0.99 LGNPSRV    +    1.10 LRETAIL_INV
(4) LTRADEX       =  – 15.95     +    2.12 LGDP            +    1.87 LUTCAPDUR
(5) LTRADEX       =  – 10.13      +    1.67 LGNPSRV     +    1.33 LUTCAPDUR
The J-test does not help to discern the best model fitting commercial barter
data. By comparing the models two by two, the J-test fails to reject any. Indeed,
data do not provide enough information to discriminate among models. If all
variables considered have some explanatory power, none of them alone is expected
to capture the full dynamic of commercial barter activity. In particular, it is clear
that both wholesale and retail trade inventories, and capacity utilization rate are all
relevant to explain commercial barter and should be both taken into account.
b) Corporate barter
To analyze corporate barter we proceeded in the same way as for the retail
one. As expected, the analysis of corporate barter brought different results.
Unlike retail barter, corporate barter does not show a clear pro-cyclical tendency.
Indeed, starting from 1990 corporate barter moves rather in a counter-cyclical
fashion, as both the graphics displaying the growth rate of real GDP and that of
total private manufactoring inventories show (Fig.8 and 10 respectively in Annex
II). However, it is worth noting that also for corporate barter the 1982 Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act had no influence on corporation barter strategy.
Unfortunately, we are not able to identify the element that in 1990 might have
provoked the change in corporate barter trend pattern.
Box 2 in Annex II contains a description of the new variables we introduced
in this second part. Indeed, besides the GDP, we find appropriate to consider as
single component of GDP also the GNP by Domestic Corporations, and in addition
the total non- farm inventories series.
As in the analysis of retail barter, we performed the ADF tests, which
indicated that also the new variables now considered are integrated of order one
(Tab. 4). Actually, for the growth of GNP by Domestic Corporations we were
confronted with the same problems encountered for the GDP growth series.11
However, like for GDP, we decided to accept the result of stationarity by the ADF
test with constant, but without trend.
Tab. 4 - ADF unit root tests for stationarity







LCORP (-2) -1.936724 -4.206011*
LGDPCORP (-1) -1.979289 -3.602646 -3.245721*
LTNONF_INV (-2) -1.833002 -4.855695**
† The critical value calculated from McKinnon tables for levels with constant and trend at
10% significance is -3.2677, at 5% is -3.6591, and at 1% significance is -4.5000.
†† The critical value calculated from McKinnon tables for levels with constant, but
without trend at 10% significance is -2.6502, at 5% is -3.0199, and at 1% significance is -
3.8067.
*Indicates rejection of null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 5% level and ** for
rejection at 1% level.
Unfortunately, in the case of corporate barter, according to the residual
based ADF-test for cointegration variables turned out not to be cointegrated neither
in group of four nor in group of three. Actually, only the group of variable
including corporate barter, GDP, and wholesale inventories passed the test at the
level of 10 percent, but not that of 5 percent, even if very close to it. Nevertheless,
we pursue our investigation by analyzing the series accounting for inventories
separately from capacity utilization rate. Unlike the case of retail barter, the trend
tendency proved to be significant and, therefore, it was included in all regressions.
Moreover, in the case of corporate barter, we found appropriate to consider all the
years for which data are available.
In table 5 are reported the results of the dynamic regressions, which intend
to captur both the short and long-run effects of the chosen explanatory variables on
corporate barter. However, we reported the implied long-run relationship from each
of the estimated equation also separately in table 6.
Unlike the commercial barter case, the coefficients of the error correction
term of all regressions are particularly large, ranging from 0.62 to 0.90, thus,
indicating a high speed of adjustment (Tab. 5). However, concerning the corporate
barter, it seems that the counter-cyclical pattern is the dominating one. According
to us, the results reflect the habit of corporations to resort to barter not on a regular
basis. In practice, they confirm that corporations' barter activity is contingent upon
their investment plans and, in particular, upon their advertising campaign
strategies, which, in turn, deeply rely on the general performance of the economy.12
Tab. 5- Error Correction Model for Corporate Barter
Estimate* Diagnostic tests **
(1) ∆LCORPt=    7.75      +   0.04 t              –    0.37 ∆LGDPt        +            0.15 ∆LTNONF_INVt +
                (2.350653)    (2.517262)         (–1.043303)              (0.786458)           )
                                          – 0.72 LCORPt-1      –   0.14 LGDPt-1    –     0.06 LTNONF_INVt-1]
                                        (–2.736191)               (–0.574526)    (–0.574310)
R
2= 0.475192   Akaike = - 4.974659   DW stat= 1.975002
Breusch-Godfrey (1lag)             χ² = 2.99 [0.08]
ARCH                                         χ² =   0.95 [0.32]
White                                          χ² = 16.53 [0.16]
Ramsey's RESET (1)            F-stat = 1.98 [0.17]
Ramsey's RESET (2)            F-stat = 1.42 [0.27]
(2) ∆LCORPt=   9.8         +  0.05 t      –   0.4 ∆LGDPt    +     0.06 ∆LWHOLE_INVt    –    0.4 ∆LCORPt-1
             (1.852707)   (1.706655)      (–1.347417)      (0.332204)  (–1.083241)
– 0.31 ∆LGDPt-1  + 0.32 ∆WHOLE_INVt-1  – 0.62 LCORPt-1  –  0.30 LGDPt-1 – 0.23 LWHOLE_INVt-
1
 (–1.176249)              (2.192632)               (–1.442772)             (–0.880683)       (–1.220994)
R
2= 0.626289    Akaike = -5.063909           DW stat= 1.975002
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                    χ² = 0.01 [0.92]
ARCH                                         χ² =   0.07 [0.78]
White                                          χ² = 19.96 [0.33]
Ramsey's RESET (1)           F-stat = 0.13 [0.71]
Ramsey's RESET (2)           F-stat = 0.11 [0.88]
(3) ∆LCORPt=   7.48       +     0.04 t      –    0.06 ∆LGDPCORPt       +     0.18 ∆LWHOLE_INVt  +
(3.274882)    (3.172881)             (–0.296557)   (1.160551)
                –    0.76 LCORPt-1       –      0.21 LGDPCORPt-1     +    0.07 LWHOLEINVt-1
                    (–2.879589)                (–1.189912)                 (0.580765)
R
2= 0.480845   Akaike = - 4.985489   DW stat= 2.233140
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                  χ² = 2.95 [0.08]
ARCH                                         χ² =   0.60 [0.43]
White                                          χ² = 19.67 [0.07]
Ramsey's RESET (1)            F-stat = 2.03 [0.17]
Ramsey's RESET (2)            F-stat = 1.48 [0.25]
(4) ∆LCORPt =    14.57     +       0.07 t       –     0.22 ∆LGDPt      +       0.09 ∆LUTCAPDURt     +
  (3.525774)      (4.187107)            (-0.515162)                  (0.537430)
                            – 0.90 LCORPt-1         –     0.70 LGDPt-1      +      0.33 LUTCAPDURt-1
                     (– 4.311002)               (-2.293383)                 (2.445579)
R
2 = 0.565447    Akaike = - 5.163373   DW stat = 2.247565
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                   χ² = 2.28 [0.13]
ARCH                                         χ² =   0.06 [0.79]
White                                          χ² = 16.25 [0.17]
Ramsey's RESET (1)             F-stat= 1.05 [0.31]
Ramsey's RESET (2)             F-stat= 1.53 [0.21]
(5) ∆LCORPt =    9.7        +       0.05 t        +      0.33 ∆LGDPCORPt       –0.16 ∆LUTCAPDURt     +
(4.480403)       (4.522444)      (1.176460)       (–1.032899)
                             – 0.80 LCORPt-1        –    0.34 LGDPCORPt-1     +       0.18 LUTCAPDURt-1
                        (–3.957931)                  (–2.186114)                   (1.928276)
R
2= 0.585138    Akaike = - 5.209746   DW stat = 2.490836
Breusch-Godfrey (1)                   χ² = 6.06 [0.01]
ARCH                                           χ² = 0.85 [0.35]
White                                            χ² = 3.00 [0.22]
Ramsey's RESET (1)            F-stat= 2.30 [0.14]
Ramsey's RESET (2)            F-stat= 1.10 [0.35]
* Values in round brackets: T-statistic
** Value in squared brackets: p-value
(Further test details available upon request.)13
Tab. 6 – Long-run relationship for Corporate Barter
(1) LCORP  =    10.76    +  0.06 t       –   0.19 LGDP        –   0.09 LTNONF_INV
(2) LCORP  =    15.88    +   0.08 t       –   0.48 LGDP       –   0.37 LWHOLE_INV
(3) LCORP  =     9.78    +   0.06 t     –   0.28 LGDPCORP  +   0.10LWHOLEINV
(4) LCORP  =    16.18    +   0.08 t       –   0.78 LGDP         +   0.36 LUTCAPDUR
(5) LCORP  =    12.12    +   0.07 t     –   0.42 LGDPCORP  +  0.22 LUTCAPDUR
As it occurred for commercial barter, the long-run influence of inventories
on corporate barter turns out to be not very clear. While in the cointegrating
vectors reported in table 6 the coefficient of the total manufacturing inventories
presents a negative sign, the coefficient of the wholesale inventories variable
displays a negative sign when considered together with GDP, and a positive one
when analyzed with GNP by domestic corporations. However, as shown in table 5,
the total manufacturing inventories variable is not statistically significant, while
the wholesale inventories one is significant only in equation (2). Therefore, by
taking into account also the higher R² value of the latter equation, we are prone to
consider the negative relation as the more plausible. However, such a negative
relation remains difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, it suggests that corporate barter
is not adopted to move excess inventories as the specialized press claims.
On the other hand, corporate barter is also particularly sensitive to the
capacity utilization of durable goods. As in the retail barter case, also for corporate
barter the coefficients of the capacity utilization rate variable in the cointegrating
vector are positive (see table 6). Therefore, even in the case of the corporate barter
sector, we do not find proof of barter as a tool corporations use to exploit under-
utilized plant capacity. On the contrary, the results corroborate the hypothesis that
also corporations use barter to increase their profitability.
Unlike the retail barter case, our results show that the corporate barter
activity tends to increase effectively during economic slowdown, suggesting a
counter-cyclical role for this kind of barter. However, such effect is dampened by
the positive relation of the capacity utilization rate.
However, the absence of cointegration and the relative low R² values make
the results in general less satisfactory than those obtained for retail barter.
Moreover, the Jarque-Bera test shows normality at rather low level of significance.
In particular, dynamic regression accounting for GNP by domestic corporations
and wholesale inventories presents the less satisfactory value. However, we decide
to include it anyway for comparative purposes.
Concerning the GNP by the Service sector, deeper investigations didn't
indicate any long-run relationship with corporate barter. Indeed, we think that for
corporate barter it would be necessary to have more detailed data on services, as
this form of barter involves almost exclusively few kind of services, that is
advertising time and space, and travel.
This idea was corroborated by the J-test. Indeed, as it occurred in the case
of commercial barter, the J-test fails to reject any model. However, while14
considering wholesale inventories and capacity utilization as still relevant
explanatory variables, we believe them not so crucial as for commercial barter.
4 - Conclusion
The empirical investigation has clearly shown that corporate barter and
trade exchange barter have different patterns. Moreover, they respond to the
economic cycle in a different way. While commercial barter follows the economic
cycle, corporate barter presents a counter-cyclical feature. Therefore, it is evident
that the two sectors of the barter industry must be studied separately. Indeed, our
results implicitly show that considering all forms of barter as equals and, in
particular, as equally inefficient can be misleading. Above all, we find the positive
relation between commercial barter and GDP, or the GNP by the service sector as
particularly significant. Such a result shows that it is not correct to link the barter
activity exclusively to situation of economic crisis and believe traders yield to
barter just to overcome unfavorable economic conditions. The profitability of
barter cannot be related and confined only to period of economic distrust and
downturns. Barter cannot be considered only as a counter-cyclical phenomenon.
However, our results suggest that barter to be profitable during economic growth
times may require a certain degree of economic development. The study of the
U.S. domestic barter implicitly supports the idea that the economic environment
plays a major role to determine the type of barter that can be developed and the
way barter can respond to the economic situation.
Moreover, the empirical results indicate that in developed economies barter
activity is often complementary to the cash economy. In particular, this seems to be
the case of commercial barter.
The results obtained for both the U.S. barter sectors do not support the view
of the specialized press. In particular, the positive sign of the capacity utilization
rate variable in the dynamic regressions show that neither businesses nor
corporations resort to barter to obtain a better exploitation of their production
capacity. On the contrary, such a positive relation reinforces the idea that barter is
adopted to increase profits and, to a greater extent, to gain a competitive edge.
However, besides this common characteristic, we can conclude that in the
U.S. economy, barter seems to incorporate two different roles. On the one hand,
the inverse relation found between corporate barter and GDP suggests that this
kind of barter can help to soften the negative effects of periodical economic
slowdowns. On the other hand, the positive relation between commercial barter
and GDP suggests that barter may also contribute to strengthen economic growth.
Clearly, a more precise indication on barter role would require a further
investigation.  Indeed, a possible future step of the analysis would consist in
analyzing how the results would alter if one took account the endogeneity of some
of the explanatory variables.15
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Annex I




Trade Exchanges Total Corporate
Companies & Trade
Exchanges
1974 850 45 895
1976 980 65 1045
1977 1130 80 1210
1978 1300 110 1410
1979 1500 165 1665
1980 1720 200 1920
1981 1980 240 2220
1982 2200 270 2470
1983 2440 300 2740
1984 2680 330 3010
1985 2900 380 3280
1986 3200 440 3640
1987 3470 500 3970
1988 3750 566 4316
1989 4050 636 4686
1990 4550 707 5257
1991 5100 781 5881
1992 5570 858 6428
1993 6050 938 6988
1994 6560 1084 7644
1995 7216 1248 8464
1996 *7749 *1356 *9105
1997 *8205 *1464 *9699
1998 *9265 *1572 *10.837
1999 *9404 *1596 *11.000
Source: IRTA
*1996-1999 figures are estimates for retail based upon average increase of the prior 5 years.








Logarithm of the volume of barter through Trade Exchanges
Logarithm of US Real Gross Domestic Product
Logarithm of US Real Gross National Product by Services
Logarithm of Total Private Inventories of Wholesale trade sector
Logarithm of Total Private Inventories of Retail trade sector






Logarithm of the volume of Corporate Barter
Logarithm of US Real Gross National Product by Domestic Corporations
Logarithm of Total Private Inventories of the Nonfarm sector18
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76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
LCORP LTRADEX
LCORP: corporate barter in level
LTRADEX: commercial barter in level






76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLCORP DLTRADEX
DLCORP: corporate barter growth
DLTRADEX: commercial barter growth19






76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLTRADEX DLGDP
DLTRADEX: commercial barter growth
DLGDP: Growth Rate of U.S. Real GDP.







76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLTRADEX DLWHOLES_INV
DLTRADEX: commercial barter growth
DLWHOLES_INV: Growth rate of U.S. Private Wholesales Inventories.20







76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLTRADEX DLRETAIL_INV
DLTRADEX: commercial barter growth
DLRETAIL_INV: Growth rate of U.S. Private Retail Trade Inventories.







76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLTRADEX DLUTCAPDUR
DLTRADEX: commercial barter growth
DLUTCAPDUR: Growth of the utilization capacity for durable goods.21






76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLTRADEX DLGNPSRV
DLTRADEX: commercial barter growth
DLGNPSRV: Growth Rate of U.S. Real GNP- Service Sector.








76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLCORP DLGDP
DLCORP: Corporate barter growth rate
DLGDP: Growth Rate of U.S. Real GDP.22











76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLCORP DLGDPCORP
DLCORP: Corporate barter growth rate
DLGDPCORP: Growth Rate of U.S. Real GDP by Domestic Corporations.
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DLCORP DLTNONF_INV
DLCORP: Corporate barter growth rate
DLTNONF_INV: Growth rate of Total Private Inventories of the Non farm Sector23







76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLCORP DLWHOLES_INV
DLCORP: Corporate barter growth rate
DLWHOLES_INV: Growth rate of U.S. Private Wholesales Inventories.







76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98
DLCORP DLUTCAPDUR
DLCORP: Corporate barter growth rate
DLUTCAPDUR: Capacity Utilization Rate for durable goods-growth rate.